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This study examines the effect that divided or unified government, in the United
States of America, has on the delegation of trade authority to the President. Using a
qualitative analysis approach, I examine competing views and formulate an independent
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Constitutionalism. I conclude that overemphasis on the impact of divided government is
misleading because trade issues provide the primary mechanism which determines the
implementation of America’s trade policies, and the principles of Constitutionalism are
valuable guidelines. Blended with the discussion is the awareness of an American ethos
which challenges formulation of trade agreements in an era of increased globalization.
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1
Introduction
International trade involves the marketing of goods and services across national
borders and also sustains a nation’s economic health. Hence, American trade relations
require the keen attention of policymakers of the world’s most powerful economy. Prior
to the twentieth century, responsibility for the Republic’s trade resided primarily in
Congress, but the negative impact of high tariffs, which contributed to the Great
Depression of the 1930’s, led to the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
(RTAA) of 1934 (Brainard and Shapiro 2001), which essentially gave the President a
degree of independence to conduct trade.
This paper provides an assessment of the delegating of trade authority to the
President and the impact of the configuration of the federal government on America’s
trade policies. Although trade politics occupy less of Americans’ attention than issues
like crime, economic prosperity and national security, the impact of international trade,
not only on the nation’s internal, but also its external affairs, warrants analysis. The
dependent variable, in this study, delegation of trade authority to the President, will be
examined in relation to two independent variables: unified government and divided
government. The significance of America’s political framework for executing this
important constitutional responsibility will be examined via three political prisms: the
international system, executive branch politics and congressional-executive relations.
American foreign policy involves dealing with friends and competitors in varying
interactions. While the use of military force against external enemies is necessary to
secure the Republic’s interests, effective management of U.S. trade relations is of greater
consequence for national prosperity. Thus, trade relations are a vital component of U.S.
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foreign policy. Therein, issue dynamics within the constitutional construct of shared
government must be appreciated. The joint responsibility of the executive and legislature,
inherent in various delegations of congressional authority, illustrates the need for
pragmatic policy initiatives in a transforming global economy. Thus, the research
question to be examined is the extent to which unified or divided government impairs
America’s leaders’ ability to implement trade policies that are beneficial to the health of
the Republic. I will also briefly examine trade legislations of two presidential
administrations as case studies: the presidency of Ronald Reagan will be examined with
reference to divided government and trade policy and the presidency of Bill Clinton will
be examined with respect to unified government and trade policy. As a backdrop to the
central issue of interaction between the independent and dependent variables, the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934 (RTAA), and its antecedents will be highlighted.
This concise study is primarily qualitative in content and its limitation is
acknowledged. While it is not an exhaustive exposition of the subject, I will assemble
relevant information and proffer an opinion on the merits of unified or divided
government’s impact on America’s trade policies. If in part the discourse sounds
tautological, or repetitive, a distinct appeal is made to the reader’s willingness to think
outside, as well as within the academic box, particularly in a post September 11, 2001
epoch, thereby, if possible, augmenting this rudimentary analysis. Thus, I will posit, as
my hypothesis, that regardless of the dynamics between Presidential trade authority and
unified or divided government, policy outcome is more issue dependent than
configuration dependent, reflecting the importance of the preferences of the American
public at any given moment.
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The Dependent Variable
Delegation of trade authority to the President is the dependent variable in this
study. The purpose of the dependent variable is to determine the effect of the different
configuration of government on the President’s ability to negotiate trade agreements. If
more or less authority is delegated under either form of government, then the President is
better equipped on one hand, and less equipped on the other, to lead the United States, the
world’s most powerful nation, in crafting trade policies that affect Americans. The
President is the most important elected official in the Republic and although Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States of America (Cato 1998) states: “He
shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties…,”
trade agreements do not fall in the category of treaties. Hence, given that foreign
policymaking is the province of the Chief Executive, the need to negotiate trade
agreements with other nations naturally falls within the realm of Presidential interactions.
However, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America (Cato
1998) also states: “The Congress shall have Power…To regulate commerce with foreign
nations…” Therefore, in order for the President to conduct trade agreements, Congress
must delegate its Constitutional responsibility to the President. Accordingly, it is within
this nexus of the institutional configuration of the federal government, impacted by the
electoral process, that the delegation of trade authority to the President will be assessed.

The Independent Variables
Unified and divided governments are the independent variables that will be used
to determine the nature of the delegation of trade authority to the President. Unified
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government occurs when the same party controls the executive and legislative branches,
and divided government occurs when control is split between both parties. Each type of
configuration of the federal government exerts a limited or significant, or at least a degree
of, impact on the formulation of trade polices by the executive branch. The intent is to
determine the importance of the configuration of the federal government to the delegation
of trade authority to the President, given the salience of issue dynamics and the principles
of Constitutionalism. Notwithstanding the federal government’s joint responsibility to
protect the welfare of Americans, the Presidential oath, or affirmation, in Article II,
Section 2, highlights the principles of the founding document in facilitating the federal
government’s task: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”

Background
In addressing the main aspects of the research question, it is informative to share a
brief historical highlight of America’s trade story with reference to the passage of one
trade agreement, The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934. The RTAA, as an
example of America’s trade policy, and delegation of trade authority to the President, is
referenced as demonstration of the interaction among institutional variables that produce
trade policy. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the world economy sank into
depression as a result of tariff wars. The Great Depression provided context for American
policymakers’ decision to move away from protectionist policies toward trade
liberalization. During the interwar years, America was not only the world’s dominant
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military power, but also the strongest economy. However, lack of international leadership
stemmed from Great Britain’s inability to effectively address interwar years trade policy
as well as America’s unwillingness to lead (Haggard 1988). Spurred by resurgent
Wilsonian liberalism and enlightened self-interest, Congress passed the RTAA in 1934.
The significance of the RTAA can be examined via two political lenses: the
international system and congressional-executive relations. The Act authorized the
President to negotiate reciprocal reductions of tariffs, within a limited range and time
period, implemented by proclamation and without implementing legislation (Sek 2003).
American failure to respond to the negative impact of the ensuing trade war would have
ensured worsening of the global economy, a situation detrimental to U.S. interests.
Notwithstanding the maladies of the international arrangements, which precipitated
American response, it can be argued that the RTAA, per se, was less the product of
changes in the international structure and more the result of changes in the norms of
international trade (Haggard 1988). President Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull
highlights this outlook:
…it is manifest that unless the Executive is given the authority to deal with the
existing great emergency somewhat on a parity with that exercised by the executive
departments of so many other governments for purposes of negotiating and carrying
into effect trade agreements, it will not be practicable or possible for the United
States to pursue with any degree of success the proposed policy of restoring our lost
international trade. (Haggard 101, 1988)
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Undoubtedly, international concerns produced the RTAA as an important foreign
policy instrument, but its ultimate significance, as a brainchild of America’s constitution,
warrants emphasis on the legal process that facilitates a dynamic American trade policy.
In evaluating the impact of the RTAA on U.S. trade policy, scholars have
provided enlightening inquiries into the congressional-executive relationship which
facilitated passage of the RTAA and their literature arrives at varying conclusions, as a
result of different research methods. An overriding interest, however, is the impact of
divided government (the executive controlled by one party and the legislature by another)
or unified government (the executive and legislature controlled by the same party) on the
delegation of trade authority. If divided or unified government exerts substantive
influence on U.S. trade decisions, then the delegation of trade authority in 1934 is
significant not only on account of the practical and psychological value of its period, but
also as a political undertaking indicative of constitutional tools by which the Republic’s
buoyancy can be maintained, amidst challenges of domestic politics and unfavorable
international norms. In focusing on this aspect of congressional-executive relationship, I
suggest that the democratic oasis of ideas and competing needs that anchored the RTAA,
will decidedly guide the trajectory of U.S. trade policy. That the American founders
provided an institutional mechanism via which to distill political conduct ultimately
profitable to the Republic’s longevity, is a signal quality that weaves itself into any facet
of Presidential responsibility to keep America prosperous in a changing international
political economy.
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America (Cato
1998) gives Congress the power “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
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Excises…” Juxtaposed with Sec 8’s provision for Congress to “regulate commerce with
foreign nations,” Congress’ delegation of power in 1934 is an instance when the
legislature recognized that it can be more advantageous for parochial interests to defer to
national interests. The guiding logic is based on responsiveness to constituency. Members
of Congress are accountable to their respective constituents and this obligation limits
their decisions on trade policy. Conversely, the President represents a national
constituency and has more latitude for a liberal trade policy. Attempts by Congress to
lower tariffs in 1934 would have encountered strong resistance by protectionist
constituents. Typically, in trade legislation, whenever each member of Congress
accommodated protectionist interests, reciprocal agreements were made among
colleagues and the cumulative effect, occasioned by this practice, described as logrolling,
was a trade policy more protectionist than intended. Although congressional delegation of
authority, in trade policy, began as early as 1890 (Epstein and O’Halloran 1996),
conventional explanation of the RTAA “focuses on how delegating authority to the
president eliminated protectionist logrolling and made more salient the costs of tariffs to
consumers that would otherwise have been neglected because they were dispersed across
electoral districts” (Hiscox 1-2, 1999).
Further assessment will be made of the divided/unified government impact on
trade relations, but the RTAA was, undoubtedly, “a profound structural shift in the
balance of trade decision making that had an equally profound impact on the substantive
outcome of the policy process” (Wittkopf and McCormick 239, 2004). The RTAA, as a
simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences (Hiscox 1999) laid the
legislative groundwork for Presidential tariff-cutting authority over decades (Sek 2003)
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and extension of the RTAA, 11 times through 1962 (Brainhard and Shapiro 2001),
maintained Presidential authority to lower tariffs. Its offshoot, the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962, expanded the President’s authority to negotiate and facilitated reductions in
tariff levels in the Kennedy Round (1964 - 67) of negotiations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Sek 2003). The 1974 Trade Act of 1974, which granted
the President “fast track authority,” the implementation by Congress of trade agreement
negotiated by the President without amendment and with limited debate, was designed to
address negotiations on tariffs, as well as nontariff barriers. Hence, by constitutional
sanction, the RTAA was simultaneously a product of earlier delegation of trade authority
and a primer for subsequent trade liberalization legislations.
While constitutionality of the RTAA is moot, it is useful to take a brief historical
look at the legal parameters of Congress’ responsibility for trade, which can flexibly
respond to political imperatives, regardless of the existing congressional-executive power
balance. The Tariff Act of 1890, which authorized the President to impose duties on
certain imports was passed by a protectionist Republican Congress and approved by the
Supreme Court in Field v. Clark (Larkin 1937). The protectionist provisions were diluted
by a Democratic Congress, in the Tariff Act of 1894, but restored when the Republicans
returned to Congress in 1897 (Larkin 1937). However, with their return, the Republicans
also granted authority to the President to reduce duties, and Presidential tariff reductions
continued until repealed by the Tariff Act of 1909 (Larkin 1937). In 1922, the FordeneyMcCumber Act delegated to the President authority to change tariff rates, as much as
fifty percent, according to his judgment (Larkin 1937), and the 1934 amendment to the
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Tariff Act of 1930 was a continuation of Congress’ practice of utilizing the influence of
the Executive in trade relations.
Although the Democratic minority of the 1920s challenged the constitutionality of
the delegation of trade authority, the Democrats’ fear of excessive delegation subsided
with Roosevelt’s election. However, litigations were initiated by protectionists, in the
Customs Court, during the months following passage of the RTAA, but failed to
eliminate the Supreme Court’s sharp line of distinction between the Chief Executive’s
discretionary powers in foreign affairs and those in internal matters, a precedent
articulated by Mr. Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation (Larkin 1937).
Technical arguments made by protectionist, that the Senate’s treaty function was
violated because the agreements under RTAA were tantamount to treaties, were
dismissed on the basis that the supreme legislative authority is Congress, and, in revenue
matters, the whole Congress is not inferior to the Senate (Larkin 1937). Thus, a bare
majority of both houses can lay down a policy and plan as a guideline for the
Administration, and should a litigant succeed in getting the Supreme Court to rule the
RTAA unconstitutional on mere technicality, Congress could pass a resolution reinstating
the tariff levels agreed to under the RTAA (Larkin 1937). In short, legal obstacles can be
resolved because of the elasticity of constitutional provisions for shared government and
the outcome of trade policy decisions, while shaped by the political dictates of any given
moment, are best crafted, pursuant to national economic health, within the sound wisdom
and creativity of legislative-executive synergy.
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It is indisputable that the significance of the congressional-executive relationship,
vis-à-vis divided or unified government, cannot sway the elastic constitutional construct,
wherein the fluidity of politics expeditiously produces unusual alliances. Nonetheless,
academic analysis of the impact of divided or unified government is of tremendous
import. Despite scholars’ divergent conclusions, a practical understanding of the strength
or weaknesses of variables and their influence on theoretical formulations is necessary for
an open-minded approach to America’s trade policies. One Scholar, David Mayhew, sees
no pattern between the control of the executive and the legislature and the delegation of
trade authority, and argues that major trade legislation has occurred under both divided
and unified government (Karol 2000). While Mayhew’s basic observations are
reasonable, they provide little understanding of legislators’ political motivation to
delegate trade authority, thereby obscuring the existence of patterns, unusual or
unexpected. Other scholars contend that Congress delegates less authority under divided
government, resulting in more protectionist trade policy and less trade liberalization
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1996). Partisanship, also informs some theorists’ support of the
impact of divided government in that the majority party in Congress may constrain the
President as part of an overall design to make the Executive responsive to its trade
agenda (Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994). These viewpoints are credible within an
institutional assessment of legislators’ motivations. Consistent with I.M. Destler’s
argument that legislators deliberately escape the pressures of special interests groups by
delegating trade authority to the President (Lohman and O’Halloran 1994), these scholars
confine their analysis to congressional electoral maneuverings.
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The proposition, however, that divided government naturally impedes
liberalization, or consistently impacts trade, is flawed on the basis that protectionism and
divided government do not produce a natural fit (Karol 2000). If congressional districts
remain unchanged in attitudes toward trade, then legislators from the free-trade party will
support Presidents of either party (Karol 2000). The pattern that emerges, when the
balance of force in Congress is examined, reveals that Presidents from protectionists’
parties gain from divided government because Presidents are more liberal in trade
outlook and, while co-partisans of the protectionist party will not support the President,
members of the free-trade party will support the President (Karol 2000). Presidents such
as Eisenhower, early Nixon, and Clinton gained from divided government (Karol 2000).
Conversely, Presidents of free-trade parties, such as Truman, Reagan and G. H.W. Bush,
who gained support mainly from co-partisans, are harmed by divided government,
according to this theory (Karol 2000). This focus is less simplistic than cultivation of
party agenda. According to this nuanced analysis, neither inter-branch relations nor
divided government can fully explain the outcome of trade policy. Instead, the make-up
of Congress, in terms of number of protectionists and free-traders of either party, is of
greater significance.
Relevant to the RTAA, a galvanizing force of America’s free trade policy, which
cannot be overlooked, is based on “exogenous changes in trade party coalitions that
altered the preferences of Republicans and Democrats enough to cement the new system
in place” (Hiscox 690, 1999). Changes in international trade norms are indeed important
to U.S. policy makers. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, reciprocity in trade
agreements with other nations engaged the attention of American exporters and, as I.M.
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Destler indicates, the Democrats “shifted the balance of trade politics by engaging the
interests of export producers since tariff reductions could now be defended as direct
means of winning new markets for American products overseas” (Hiscox 678, 1999). The
post World War II boom in America’s trade sector, the shift in the Republican Party’s
base to more export-oriented constituencies and the long-term shift in U.S. comparative
advantage in capital-intensive production affected inter-branch politics, as well as the
congressional balance of force. It is the evolution of trade dynamics, supported by the
evolution of America’s constitutionalism which is central to America’s trade legislations.
It cannot be overemphasized that the mechanism facilitating American creativity to
mitigate collision of domestic and international political processes is the evolution of
constitutional principles, without which the strain of competing international economic
forces, in the future, can dwarf the socio-economic tensions of America’s Civil War.
Thus, seen through the prisms of the RTAA, the international system, executive
branch politics and congressional-executive relationship provide explanations for the
decision to delegate trade authority to the President, as well as highlight long-term impact
on U.S. foreign policy. While the international system and executive branch politics’
perspectives afford substantive information, it is the executive-congressional relationship,
undergirded by an elastic Constitution, which defines the parameters for continued
engagement among American policymakers and interest groups in the area of trade. This
interaction is complex, not only within the context of divided or unified government, but
also as a result of the transformation of the American economy. The endeavor herein is a
basic examination of a seminal dimension of America’s vibrancy. While a full
understanding of the forces, integral in the development of America’s trade polices, will
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not be easily acquired, I will further examine the relationship between the independent
variables, divided and unified government, and the dependent variable, delegation of
trade authority to the President.

Perspectives: Unified or Divided Government and Trade
Already, we have gleaned, from the significance of the RTAA, an understanding
of various approaches concerning the impact of the federal government’s configuration
on trade policy. Yet, what is the essence of the political construct? Is it a configuration
haphazard in structure or is it more reflective of the genius of America’s separation of
powers? Unified or undivided government has been a feature of American national
politics during the nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century (Reuss 1996-97).
Undivided government accounts for the unruffled conservatism of Republican
administrations from the Civil War to 1900, the whiff of Republican populism
under Theodore Roosevelt, the modest activism of Democrats in Wilson’s first
term, the triumph of Republican conservatism in the 1920s and of the New Deal in
the 1930s and 1940s. (Reuss 2, 1996-97)
Prior to the mid-twentieth century unified government has occurred the majority of the
time. The emergence of strong political parties facilitated unified government and “until
1950 divided government occurred only 25 percent of the time” (Reuss 2, 1996-97).
Divided government, a post World War II feature, emerged in the mid-twentieth century
and, between 1946 and 1990, “party control of the U.S. government has been formally
divided for twenty-six years and unified for eighteen” (Mayhew 637, 1991a). These
contrasting periods of party control of the U. S. government has led to the variety of
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scholarly opinions on unified versus divided government in general, as well as their
implications for U.S. trade policy. The early scholarly view of this question, from the
perspective of the impact of divided government on U. S. trade policy, contended that
divided government has no discernible impact on trade policy, as major trade legislations
occurred under both unified and divided government (Mayhew 1991b), and challenged
conventional wisdom. This view is supported by the argument that public policy
generally responds to changes in public opinion, so political actors only have a marginal
impact on the passage of legislations (Mayhew 1991b).
Other scholars responded to Mayhew’s view and formulated their own concepts. As
the RTAA example illustrates, divergent views have merit and warrant due analysis. A
counter-veiling opinion holds that divided government significantly impacts presidential
and congressional policy-making (Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994). Protectionism is
argued to be the result of divided government not merely on account of direct
legislations, but also by indirect influence, via administrative agencies (Epstein and O’
Halloran 1996). The importance of executive branch politics is central to the analysis of
these theorists. They contend that in the modern administrative state, much important
policy is made not by direct legislation, but by administrative agencies. These agencies
are located in the executive branch, but they are overseen by Congress. “One important
question to ask, then, is how divided government alters the preferences, institutions, and
incentives that shape agency decision making” (374). Their claim that divided
government impacts trade policy, through administrative procedures designed by
Congress for executive agencies, is a practical and enlightening approach to U. S. trade
policy-making. In fact, given the decline of America as a hegemon and the continued
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evolution of a new global order, facilitated by the institutions of the international political
economy, any indirect influence which significantly affects U. S. trade policy warrants
insightful analysis. If administrative procedures can determine the nature of America’s
trade and a political entity can design procedures that impact the economic fortunes of the
United States, then Epstein and O’ Halloran’s thesis can be extrapolated to affirm the
central proposition being advanced in this essay: trade policy outcome is issue dependent
and effective harnessing of the Constitutional principles of the United States is essential
to America’s prosperity and security. Constitutional integrity is the framework which
facilitates the requisite executive-legislative synergy to implement trade agreements
compatible with market dynamics of the international political economy, yet beneficial to
America’s national needs. The spirit of effective governance is Constitutional integrity.
The institutional factor which adheres to the rubric of this study should not be
viewed as solely national in perspective, because trade among nations is subject to
international norms and procedures, which are per se institutions wherein conflicting
interests are addressed. Hence, any attempt to challenge current and future American
policy-makers vis-à-vis interactions between domestic and international imperatives of
trade, constrained within unprecedented global interdependence, can be graciously
countenanced and appropriated by capable and astute Americans. Indeed, with the
inevitability of increased globalization, comes the need to construct prudent, wholistic,
policies, which preserve America’s economic and national interests. The significant
relationship between the dynamics of trade policies and international economic activities
is an undercurrent woven into potential global economic conflicts. “Among scholars of
foreign economic policy making, there is now widespread agreement on the importance
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of combining international and domestic factors of explanation through a synthesis of
structural and systemic, society and state-centered, and ideational approaches” (Shoch
113, 1998).
Parsimony and limited scholastic capacity restrict in-depth evaluations of the
ramifications of subtle, indirect influences on America’s trade policy, but the motive
force which undergirds this academic enquiry compels a response to the necessity to
advocate a multifaceted approach to secure America’s institutions of Democratic
Republicanism. That divided government leads to protectionism in U.S. trade policy, as a
result of Congress’ configuration of agencies within the executive branch is the major
point being made by Epstein and O’ Halloran is evident, yet it is a provocative
institutional analysis relevant to the trajectory of America’s trade policies and the
international political economy.
The rhetoric herein is not the province of misguided, unreasoned pessimistic
clamor. It does not foresee the effacing of America’s grandeur, akin to the demise of
Greece and Rome of ancient times. It is a timely and respectful exercise of Constitutional
liberty flowing within the stream of competing ideas and deposited within an institution,
the foundations of which embraced ennobling aspects of the American Republic, to wit:
engagement in the Judeo-Christian enterprise of industry and prosperity on earth;
vigorous commitment to peace and goodwill, at home and abroad; judicial improvement
of politico-social contradictions; and patient preparation for the long-awaited second
Advent. Wise, patriotic observers, with carefully measured awareness, can respond to
idiosyncrasies that might contain a grain of truth, sufficient for effective delegation of
trade authority to the President, regardless of configuration of the federal government. In
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any event, it is the principles of the Constitution of the United States that must be
preserved, protected and defended. Ancient wisdom teaches: “…there is no new thing
under the sun” (Prov. 1. 9, Holy Bible)). Repetition can be instructive, given the cliché,
‘history repeats itself.’ The prophetic reaffirmation, in St John 3 vs. 14 –18, of America’s
dominant spiritual ethos, which declares:
And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man
be lifted up: That whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal
life. For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever
believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent not his
Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be
saved. He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is
condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten
Son of God. (Holy Bible)
reflects Solomon’s observations in Ecclesiastes 3 vs. 14 – 18:
I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor
any thing taken from it, that men should fear before him. That which hath been is
now; and that which is to be hath already been; and God requireth that which is
past. And moreover I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was
there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there. I said in mine heart,
God shall judge the righteous and the wicked: for there is a time for every purpose
and every work. I said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men, that
God might manifest them, and that they might see that themselves are beasts. (Holy
Bible)
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Allegories and metaphors do enhance communication, yet, in the spirit of liberty,
and in deference to literalism, when, accordingly, a penultimate political construct, in
congruence with the international political economy, manifests the deceptive apocalyptic
beast, America’s trade policies must be therein streamlined. The awareness herein is
crucial. Doomsday prophecies are common, yet an encouraging word in due season is
useful. That international trade tensions will increase is simply a fact of global economic
competition, driven by new technology. America’s ability to effectively engage in trade
depends on judicial handling of the latitude of its Constitution. “Trade conflicts are a
reflection of converging, not diverging, political relations” (Nau 101, 1995) among
nations and, although trade is a significant facet of America’s national security,
policymakers must not “advocate a drastic reconfiguration of America’s security interests
that ruptures America’s relations with other democratic societies” (Nau 101, 1995). It is
of utmost importance for civic-minded Americans to appreciate that a multidiscipline
approach by American scholars, (secular and sectarian) and policymakers can guide the
United States through inevitable trade conflicts and future challenges, including the
apocalyptic time of trouble that will engulf all nations, as globalization progresses.
Realistically, American Constitutionalism can facilitate the right of the inhabitants
of the United States to freely engage in trade within a changing global economy,
regardless of international political configurations, while simultaneously executing the
Sovereign virtues bestowed by the Constitution to: “…provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
posterity…” (Cato 1998).
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Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff provide another perspective of the impact
of divided government on international trade negotiations. Their analysis is a relative of
the legislative-executive dialectic. Specifically, they examine the influence of elections
on government configuration and trade agreements. Arguing that the uncertainty of
election outcomes restricts the chief executive’s ability to negotiate trade agreements,
they further claim that under divided government, the uncertainty of elections “makes
divided government more negative for cooperation” (140) and “more divisions in
government before an election make agreements more protectionist” (140). Thus, by
diminishing the chances for the ratification of trade negotiations, divided government,
they contend, is less efficient than unified government. The stifling of U. S. trade
liberalization is a constant feature of the critique of divided government and the focus on
the institution of elections highlights the importance of Constitutional provisions. In
America, election cycles are predictable, thus trade negotiations can slow down in
anticipation of an upcoming election and its outcome. Lobbyists in the behalf of foreign
interests, as well as foreign negotiators, are often conversant with the trade preferences of
important legislators. Although Presidents are more inclined toward free trade, given the
proposition that divided government is more protectionist than unified government, the
outcome of Presidential and Congressional elections seems an important determinant of
U. S. trade policies.
In an effort to address the negative impact of divided government, or gridlock, on
the effectiveness of government, members of the 1981 Committee on the Constitutional
System, proposed a two-part constitutional amendment:
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1. Adopt four-year terms for House members and eight-year terms for members of
the Senate, with elections in presidential years for all House members and half the
senators…With all the House and one-half the Senate elected at the same time as
the President, the chances of cooperation between the two branches would seem to
be improved…
2. The second part of the amendment would empower either the Congress or the
President, in the case of gridlock, to call for prompt presidential and congressional
elections for new, full terms… (Reuss 3, 1996-97).
This proposal has not been accepted and, although the 1987 committee report held the
view that “our hope that Congress will soon initiate a study to determine whether the
Constitution in its present form can provide effective, accountable government for a third
century” (Reuss 4, 1996-97), such a change is unlikely. Divided government is an
acceptable way of life for the American electorate. Its braking-effect on the federal
government seems to be a desirable aspect of American politics (Reuss 1996-97). In fact,
…the American people seem to want divided government at times like the present,
when the great domestic issues of increasing inequality of incomes and wealth,
health care, Medicare, and Social Security, and the great foreign policy issues of
our role as a superpower have not yet developed party-wide solutions by either the
Republicans or the Democrats. To prevent either from going too far in this era of
government-without-a-mandate, the brake of divided government may not at all be
bad. (Reuss 5, 1996-97)
The acceptance of divided government by Americans is significant for U. S. trade policy.
Despite Milner and Rosendorff’s accurate analysis on the effect of elections, during
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divided government, on trade negotiations, consensus on the best trade policy for
America is in flux. Whereas, free trade is beneficial for all nations and its benefits are
acknowledged by most Americans, there are sectional winners and losers of trade
agreements. If divided government inhibits trade liberalization and Americans accept the
compromise of divided government, then the continued transformation of global trading,
with new and efficient competitors, might not necessarily ensnare American policymakers into agreements that are not in the best interests of American consumers and
workers. Since the 1980’s, protectionist legislations that passed Congress responded to
“demands for fair trade” (Oatley 246, 2006) from Americans. The challenge, therefore,
will be less the effect of the configuration of the federal government on Presidential trade
authority and more the facilitating of the “demands” and wishes of the American people,
while simultaneously maintaining American democracy and global influence:
Trade policy is both an expression of a country’s own domestic society and an
instrument for safeguarding the security of that society. America practices freer
trade because its domestic society favors consumers and freedom of choice and
because open international markets add to transparency and tolerance in foreign
relations. How far can America go in compromising its commitment to freer trade
without restricting freedom at home and reducing tolerance abroad? (Nau, 98, 1995)
The crux of the issue is that strategic and effective trade policy for America is issue
driven and devolves on the joint constitutional responsibilities of the President and
Congress, whether or not the federal government is unified or divided. The Constitution’s
Framers did not anticipate party formation, yet their flexible guide for governance
transcends political dichotomies. Wherein “trade policy becomes increasingly hostage to
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special interests that care little about national security or, for that matter, comprehensive
national economic interest” (Nau 6, 1995) great care must be made, by policy makers
who hold the nation’s best interests at heart, to proactively craft trade policies that foster
prosperity and security.
Essentially, global trade is merely reflective of mankind’s accomplishments in
areas such as technology and civility. Unfortunately, greed is a vice that attends the
acquisition of material wealth. Hence, America’s trade policy must reflect the desires and
best interests of the American people, and, accordingly, compromises with foreign
competitors might at times be required. America’s future, as a constitutional Republic is
definitely safeguarded within the framework of separation of powers and the benefits of
trade policy are vested in the interaction between the peoples’ representatives and the
nation’s chief executive, pursuant to issue dynamics. Indeed, it is in the capacity of
delegated officials, or trustees of the people’s best interests, that Congress can
accordingly delegate, or not delegate, trade authority to the President, whether or not the
government is divided or unified.
An interesting perspective on gridlock, an alternate description of divided
government, is presented by Sarah Binder (1999). Examining the issue via the legislativeexecutive prism, she emphasizes that intrabranch rivalry is most crucial in causing
gridlock. Binder identifies bicameralism, the division of Congress into the House and the
Senate, as the principal cause of intrabranch disagreement. This is an important
consideration. The House of Representatives is a large and diverse body and its policy
interests will be less nationally oriented and more constituency-based. The Senate is
smaller body, collegial in nature, with a more conservative and national outlook than the
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House. Though partisan and electoral factors shape the nature of divided government,
intrabranch rivalry will occur under both divided and unified government. Binder argues
that: “treating bicameral bodies as if they were unicameral risks overlooking important
differences. House-Senate differences, not simply legislative-executive conflicts, have
structured patterns of giridlock in postwar American politics” (530). The implications of
interbranch rivalry for trade policy can be seen in the different nature of representation of
both branches. The House, with its smaller constituency, focuses on parochial interests
and is more protectionist in policy formulation, while the Senate, with its larger
constituency, is more likely to support trade liberalization. This dynamic exists under
both unified and divided government. Given Binder’s acknowledgement that separation
of power and bicameralism were central to the beliefs about the proper construction of
political institutions in 1787, the focus on the effect of the configuration of the federal
government on the delegation of trade authority to the President, must appreciate the
impact that trade issues have on representative politics.
David Karol’s Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About
Nothing? reiterates the proposition that overemphasis on the effect of divided
government on U.S. trade policy is needless. Karol’s view, previously referenced, is an
appropriate paradigm by which to advance the issue dynamics thesis, central to this
paper. In presenting his case that generalizations about divided government’s effect on
U.S. trade are unfounded, Karol makes three assumptions:
1. Political parties differ in the extent to which they support trade liberalization.
2. Postwar presidents favor freer trade (presidential liberalism), so delegation of
authority to them leads to liberalization.
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3. Members of Congress know that granting authority to the president results in
freer trade. Consequently, their support for presidential authority is a function
of their interest in trade liberalization. (826)
Karol refutes the assumptions that divided government leads to protectionism and
argues that divided government need not reduce delegation of trade authority to the
President and can increase it under certain circumstances. Karol argues that congressional
parties differ on trade, which affects the legislative process and, by presenting
permutations of government configurations, such as unified protectionist government,
unified liberal government, divided protectionist government and divided liberal
government, Karol also shows that divided government can be “sticky” (829) and prevent
much change from occurring. Yet, given the extremes of protectionism, under one form
of unified government and of free trade under the other, divided government’s
moderating effects are not impediments, but benign.
The claim that divided government inhibits trade liberalization is further
weakened by Presidential liberalism, asserts Karol. While acknowledging the
incorporation of Presidential liberalism in other studies on the effect of divided
government, he critiques their inadequacy. Regardless of party affiliation, postwar
Presidents are free traders and supported by congressional liberals on trade issues. In
highlighting that “divided government will increase delegation for a president from the
protectionist party as liberals replace the president’s recalcitrant co-partisans” (829),
Karol emphasizes the need for examining the presidential liberalism variable. He rejects
Milner and Rosendorff’s argument that “divided government…occurs when the
preferences of the executive and legislators are far apart” (829). In other words, a
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President from a protectionist party and a congress controlled by trade liberals are not
automatically estranged in the trade policy making process.
That trade liberalization, and Presidents from a protectionist party can benefit from
divided government, seriously wounds contrary argument is the result of failure to
carefully examine all available factors. In fact, Karol posits that the “fatal flaw in theories
linking divided government and protectionism is their failure to connect party affiliation
to trade policy preferences among legislators” (830). Karol’s analysis reflects the extent
to which constituency imperatives shape the contours of divided government and make it
less easy to articulate an established principle concerning the phenomenon of divided
government. Karol aptly states:
For divided government to reduce delegation, congressional parties must reverse
relative positions depending on the president’s party. For this model to be credible,
empirical inquiry must show not only that legislators defer to “their” presidents but
also that this tendency outweighs any “party constituency effect” driving legislators
to support protection or free trade. (831).
It is not that scholars such as Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994) and Milner (1997)
do not discuss partisanship; it is their failure to make the connection that assails their
efforts. Karol also contends that the premise that parties do not affect trade policy cannot
be supported empirically. He provides a compelling example of representation in the
Senate. A Democratic and a Republican senator from the same state frequently hold
different trade policy positions, which Karol attributes to a difference in “constituency”
(831) representation. Unions are more inclined to support Democrats, while “exportoriented corporate and agricultural interests” (831) are more inclined to support
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Republicans. Regardless of government configuration, partisan interaction in trade policy
is indeed vital to the type of policy enacted: “Trade policy is one of the most important
and contentious issues faced by the modern state. In addition to its impact on national
economic welfare, trade policy is highly distributive in nature, and thus often
controversial” (Hankla 1134, 2006).
Karol’s strong conclusion that “assertions that divided government impedes
liberalization, or indeed has any consistent effect on trade policy, are groundless,” (841)
fortifies the argument for issue dynamics. The interaction between institutional and
constituency-based preferences, highlighted by Karol, is crucial for an appreciation of the
main issue. Karol aptly concludes: “Advances in explaining policy outcomes will come
not from focusing on interbranch relations and divided government but from more closely
examining the changing balance of forces in Congress and the country” (842). It is from
“the changing balance of forces” that all else exudes and the signal dynamic of America’s
political life is the ongoing adaptation of the Constitutional Republic to emerging
challenges.

The Reagan Presidency
President Ronald Reagan took office in 1980, under divided government and the
Reagan Presidency remained an era of divided government. While, the Republicans
controlled the White House, under Reagan, the Democrats controlled both branches of
Congress. During Reagan’s second term, Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988. The passage of such important trade legislation under
divided government mutes the claim that divided government hinders delegation of trade
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authority to the President. Yet, it still might be argued that the protectionist elements of
the Act prove that divided government hinders trade liberalization. A closer examination
of the circumstance surrounding the origin and intent of the Act reveals that claims about
the negative effect of divided government on trade liberalization are seriously flawed.
The prisms of the international system, executive branch politics and legislativeexecutive relations are all reflected herein. The years being considered under the Reagan
Presidency are 1987-1988.
In April 1987, a trade dispute developed between Japan and the United States.
Allegedly, the Toshiba Machine Company, along with Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik, a
company from Norway, sold submarine technology to the Soviet Union, in violation of
export rules (Rothgeb 2001). This sale enhanced the capabilities of Soviet submarines
and made it difficult for America to track the Soviet fleet. The Japanese government
denied that the Toshiba Company violated export rules. The situation developed when
Congress was considering a new trade bill delegating authority to President Reagan to
increase trade liberalization. This trade debacle also developed at a time when the U.S.
was experiencing an increase in trade deficit and trade policy had public salience. Some
members of Congress desired other nations to reduce their trade surplus with the U.S. and
many members of Congress were angry with the discovery of Japan’s trade impropriety.
Swift response by Congress resulted in an amendment to the trade bill that banned
Toshiba and Kongsberg products from America for a period of two to five years.
However, the bill was not passed that year and, in 1988, with the passage of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act, the penalty was reduced to three years in which the U.S.
government could not purchase products from these companies.
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The premise that divided government impedes trade liberalization can be
advanced on account of two provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act was rewritten and expanded with Super 301 and
Special 301, two new provisions (Rothgeb 2001). Under Super 301, U.S. trade
representatives should establish market priorities for 1989 and 1990 and identify violators
and violations of fair trade, which must be rectified by negotiations within three years.
(Rothgeb 2001). Special 301 required U.S. trade representatives to identify countries
violating the intellectual property rights of American exporters and conduct negotiations
to resolve the problem (Rothgeb 2001). Retaliatory measures could be taken by the
President under both provisions if negotiations failed to resolve the problems (Rothgeb
2001). The protectionist nature of these two provisions seems to give credence to the
claim concerning the negative effect of divided government on trade liberalization.
However, the mitigating effect of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988, on
the more stringent penalties on Toshiba and Kongsberg, serves to preserve, rather than to
restrict, free trade. A previous amendment by Democratic Rep. Richard Gephardt, to
reduce trade surpluses, was also eliminated by the Omnibus and Trade Competitiveness
Act of 1988. Moreover, far from being protectionist, the Act was actually an aggressive
effort to promote free trade, in that America was using retaliation to convince other
countries to reduce their own trade barriers (Shoch 2001). Even before the Toshiba
debacle “Congress was considering a new trade bill, intended to give the president more
power to pry open foreign markets and to eliminate unfair trade” (Rothgeb 190, 2001).
Undoubtedly, it can be accepted that the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 effectively refutes the contention that divided government is bad for trade
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liberalization. In fact, the “final bill emerged as a bipartisan compromise, both between
the congressional parties and between the Reagan and the Democratic congressional
leadership” (Shoch 128, 1998). Repetition, can be an insightful theme, thus the “changing
balance of forces,” (Karol 2000) by which history repeats itself, provide irrefutable
evidence that academic insight into the trends of divided government must be informed
by issue dynamics which facilitate unpredictable politicking in the shared interests of
political actors and the best interests of the Republic. The Reagan case adequately
substantiates the theory that policy outcome is more issue dependent than configuration
dependent. Public salience of trade issues influenced the interaction between Congress
and the President and produced a reasonable trade policy outcome under divided
government.
In sum, the Reagan example establishes that divided government does not
necessarily inhibit trade liberalization. Economic consequences of free trade, such as the
rising trade deficit and Japan’s growing economic strength engaged lawmakers’ attention
and produced a nuanced bill that, in effect, promoted trade liberalization. Trade issues
and not configuration of government provided the driving force.

The Clinton Presidency
President Bill Clinton took office in 1992 under unified government, yet only his
first two years in office were under unified government. In 1994, the Republicans took
control of Congress. During President Clinton’s first two years, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was passed. Although NAFTA was successfully passed, in
1993, the premise that unified government facilitates trade liberalization was not
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fortified. The debates surrounding NAFTA were intense and President Clinton faced
huge opposition from his own partisans. The prisms of the international system, executive
branch politics and legislative-executive relations are also reflected herein. The years
being considered under the Clinton Presidency are 1992-1993.
NAFTA originated under divided government, during the Republican Presidency
of George H.W. Bush. In 1991, President Bush informed Congress of his intention to
negotiate a regional trade agreement with Mexico and Canada (Shoch 2000).
Multinational corporations, competitive agricultural exporters and high technology and
other manufacturing exporters favored NAFTA, while opponents of NAFTA were laborintensive, import-competing agricultural and industrial interests (Shoch 2000). The bill
went through both the House and the Senate and was completed in August 1992 (Shoch
2000). In November 1992, a new type of Democrat, free-trading, Governor Bill Clinton,
became President. An important concern of labor regarding NAFTA was a guarantee for
effective enforcement of labor and environmental laws and supporters of labor hoped that
a Democratic Presidency, with a new Congress, under a unified government, would not
support NAFTA. President Clinton became embroiled in conflict between business and
labor, with the AFL-CIO, strong supporters of the Democratic Party, mobilizing heavily
against NAFTA. An unusual set of alliance emerged against NAFTA, including:
environmentalists, human rights activists, Ross Perot, Pat Buchanan, Jesse Jackson and
Ralph Nader (Shoch 2000). Even influential Democratic leaders such as, House Majority
Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and House Whip David Bonior (D-MI) opposed
President Clinton’s support for NAFTA.
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Initially, Clinton was hesitant about being fully engaged in supporting NAFTA.
Eventually, however, he gave full support to implementing NAFTA. His commitment
caused the pro-NAFTA forces to rally together. Business coalitions, media elites,
Republican Congressional leadership and moderate and free traders of the Democratic
Leadership Council convinced Congress of the importance of the legislation (Shoch
2000). In November 1993, NAFTA passed the House and Senate by votes of 234 - 200
and 61 - 38, respectively and the President singed the legislation. (Shoch 2000)
NAFTA was a significant legislation in trade liberalization and also important in
establishing that claims about unified or divided government’s effect on trade can be
simplistic. The details of NAFTA were structured under the divided government of
President Bush. Unified government’s hypothesis required the Democrats to support
NAFTA and delegate authority to the President. However, variables of partisan
preferences and ideology demonstrate that there are no natural fits relative to
configurations of the federal government and policy outcomes in general, and trade
policy in particular. Although 40% of House Democrats voted in favor of NAFTA
(Shoch 2006), more than three-quarters of House Republicans voted in favor (Shoch
2000). Clearly, policy outcome is more issue dependent than configuration dependent.
Significantly, it is difficult to predict the outcome of an initiative merely on the basis of
whether or not the government is unified or divided. Indeed, the NAFTA vote was a big
win for President Clinton – “the biggest of his presidency” (I.M. Destler 228, 1995), yet
it was made possible, under unified government, not by overwhelming support from his
congressional partisans, but by support from Republicans.
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The passage of NAFTA, despite unified government, instead of because of
unified government, effectively supports the hypothesis that policy outcome is more issue
dependent than configuration dependent. The importance of NAFTA’s irony resides in
situational dynamics that can never be effectively predicted in politics. NAFTA’s
intersection of aspirations vis-à-vis domestic and national interests is a microcosm of
globalization’s challenges and emphasizes the tension inherent in the unfolding of a New
World Order, wherein principles of representation must support issue dynamics’ cogency.
In sum, the Clinton case proves that unified government does not naturally
produce trade liberalization. Opposition by members of Clinton’s own party demonstrates
the significance of issue dynamics. Labor’s influence on Democrats impeded NAFTA’s
passage. Thus, even under unified government, Congressmen are influenced by the policy
preferences of their constituents and issues are the main determinant of policy formation.

Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed America’s interaction with free trade, using the
RTAA as a focal point to initiate discussion. I examined some scholars’ opinions of the
effect of the independent variables, unified and divided government, on the dependent
variable, delegation of trade authority to the President. In support of the thesis that it is
the dynamics of trade issues which provide more meaningful insight into the federal
government’s design of trade policies, I proffered a particular theme: although history
repeats itself, the past provides a guide for the future. The passage of two trade bills,
under the Reagan and Clinton Presidencies, were also used as case studies to establish the
indeterminacy of assertions concerning effects of the independent variables.
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The purpose of this study is a basic evaluation of the dynamics of the
configuration of the federal government vis-à-vis America’s trade policies. Its guiding
logic is neither jingoist nor unduly alarmist. It acknowledges that the lessons of history
can guide the inevitable transformation of America’s global supremacy. Interwoven in its
academic objective is a spiritual salience, a subset of issue perspectives, perhaps best
expressed by more competent researchers.
While the issue driven importance of trade policies is clear, evaluation of the
principles of America’s Constitutionalism deserve latitude. Although the Constitution
sets the stage for inter branch politics by giving Congress control over trade and the
President control over foreign policy, modern trade policy is not addressed by the
document. In fact, it is true that Congress and the President have been creative vis-à-vis
separation of powers in formulating trade policies and over the last 225 years trade policy
has been dynamic under the same Constitution. Yet, it is the pragmatic spirit of
innovative thinking that the Framers applied to the framing of the Constitution which
guides modern trade policies. While this paper is limited in scope and scholastic range, I
hope that the reader’s mind has been sufficiently engaged to appreciate the responsibility
of the federal government and the American citizenry to effectively engage in daily
interactions with the benefits of the lessons of history and, as an element of a work
blended with America’s dominant ethos, hope in the good news for the future. Trade
policies affect all Americans and the interaction among nations in an era of
unprecedented globalization, and intricate trade issues, makes relevant an academic
exercise flavored with the sacred awareness that, indeed, “we know in part…” (1 Cor. 13
v. 9, Holy Bible).
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Thus, the constitutional framework of dynamic and adaptable principles, which
the American founders established, though imperfect, provides a visionary structure -- a
legacy of sorts for future generations -- which can facilitate the desires of some while
protecting the rights of others. Freedom to trade is as important as freedom of speech and
religion. America’s political synergy will be tested by changing winds of time, but, as an
eagle resiliently soars above contrary winds, so it is, by God’s grace, and prudent
implementation of constitutional principles, that the American Republic will be resilient.
In essence, America’s Constitutionalism is structured on established principles to
guide policymakers in uncharted territory and provides elasticity to preserve the Republic
and innovatively accommodate volatile trade issues. Herein is a relevant view:
To expect the Constitution to guide decision making in all situations is impossibly
naïve. By the same token, to suggest that all actions taken by government officials
in emergencies not traceable to constitutional text are simply actions taken outside
the law, is more than a little dangerous. The Constitution as writ large was designed
to guide the government in the normal course of policy making as well as in the
breach. (Franklin 137, 1991)
Clearly, configuration of the federal government is not an overarching determinant
of America’s trade policy. Pursuant to issue dynamics, even when Americans choose to
put their trust in God, during challenges of biblical proportions, political participants can
also elect to say:
In the end we have to put our trust in the rough-and-tumble of politics. To ensure
that this rough-and-tumble would not create too radical a result, the framers created
a political balance which remains vital to this day…The adherence to and nurturing
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of that system through the protection of the process of representation and the
promotion of the principle of process is the surest path to constitutional intent.
(Franklin 138, 1991)
Various facets of trade will continue to affect daily living, and, until the Creator
dispenses with imperfect political constructs, we must continue to make life better for our
loved ones and ourselves. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to see beyond tomorrow’s dawn,
yet, if the Messianic promise holds true for a better world, then changes in trade politics
are simply part of the prelude. Even so, despite the complexity of trade issues and
regardless

of

public

policy

challenges,

within

the

principles

of

American

Constitutionalism exists a significant opportunity to access God’s grace for future
generations.
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